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Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a novel CoV known to cause severe acute 
respiratory illness in humans; ≈40% of confirmed cases 
have been fatal. Human-to-human transmission and mul-
tiple outbreaks of respiratory illness have been attributed to 
MERS-CoV, and severe respiratory illness caused by this 
virus continues to be identified. MERS-CoV was first re-
ported in September 2012, and subsequent investigations 
documented illness onsets as early as April 2012 (1). As 
of February 23, 2014, the World Health Organization has 
reported 182 laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS-CoV 
infection, including 79 deaths, indicating an ongoing risk 
for transmission to humans in the Arabian Peninsula (2). 
The median age of reported case-patients is 52 years (range 
2–94 years); most cases are in males (3). Most index case-
patients have at least reported 1 chronic comorbid condition 
(4) and have resided in, or recently traveled to, Jordan, Qa-
tar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia 
(3). In France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and Tu-
nisia confirmed cases of MERS-CoV have been identified 
in travelers returning from these countries (3). Although 
a zoonotic reservoir of MERS-CoV has been speculated, 
very little is known about the specific exposures that result 
in primary human cases.
MERS-CoV infection causes severe acute hypoxemic 
respiratory failure, extrapulmonary organ dysfunction, and 
high rates of death; however, the spectrum of illness and 
clinical course are not fully defined (5). Evidence suggests 
that MERS-CoV is capable of limited human-to-human 
transmission, which results in outbreaks in family and 
health care settings (5,6). The 182 reported cases include 
multiple distinct spatiotemporal clusters and 32 identified 
infections in health care workers (3). Modeling performed 
to assess the extent of human infection and the transmission 
potential of MERS-CoV (as of August 2013) estimated that 
most symptomatic case-patients had not been detected but 
that chains of transmission were not self-sustaining when 
infection control was implemented (7). Despite evidence 
of human-to-human transmission, the number of contacts 
infected by persons with confirmed infections appears to 
be limited; sustained transmission in the community has 
not been documented (3). The Hajj, the annual religious 
pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, involved 1.37 million pilgrims 
from 188 countries in 2013 but resulted in no reports of 
confirmed cases in the weeks after the pilgrimage (3).
Little is known about the pathogenic potential and 
transmission dynamics of MERS-CoV. Although multiple 
health care–associated clusters have been identified (4), 
further investigation is needed of the specific risk factors 
for transmission within health care facilities. Basic in-
formation about the temporal and causal patterns of viral 
shedding and their relationships to clinical outcomes is 
critical to further understand the virus and to shape pre-
vention and control measures needed to limit transmis-
sion. Standard, contact, and airborne precautions appear to 
be effective in limiting transmission and are recommended 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to man-
age known or suspected MERS-CoV infection in hospital-
ized patients as a primary means of preventing and con-
trolling transmission (8).
Potential animal reservoirs and mechanism(s) of 
transmission of MERS-CoV to humans remain unclear. 
Of the minority of case-patients for whom information 
is available about exposure to animals, few have report-
ed owning or visiting a farm with camels, goats, sheep, 
chickens, ducks, or other animals (4). A zoonotic origin 
for MERS-CoV was initially suggested by its high genetic 
similarity to bat CoVs (9) and the identification of closely 
related viruses in bats (10). Recent reports have described 
additional data from camels. These include real-time re-
verse transcription PCR detection and limited sequencing 
of MERS-CoV from 3 camels from a farm in Qatar linked 
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to 2 infections in humans in October 2013 (11) and, more 
recently, in camels in Saudi Arabia (12), and antibodies 
against MERS-CoV in camel serum from the Arabian Pen-
insula, including serum from the United Arab Emirates 
drawn in 2003 (13–17). However, more epidemiologic 
data linking cases to infected animals are needed to deter-
mine whether a particular animal species is a host for the 
virus, a source of human infection, or both.
This month’s issue of Emerging Infectious Diseas-
es presents results of a study that provides evidence of 
MERS-CoV in dromedary camels in Egypt (18). Only 3 
other reports of MERS-CoV detection in animals have 
been published: 1 in a bat and 2 in camels (11,12,19). 
However, these reports were based on limited genetic 
information. In contrast, on the basis of their sequence 
analysis of nearly the entire viral genome showing >99% 
nt sequence identity with human MERS-CoV, Chu et al. 
provide the most compelling evidence thus far of MERS-
CoV infection in dromedary camels (18). Although the 
authors also found neutralizing antibodies to MERS-CoV 
(or a MERS-like CoV) in most of the camels, they did 
not find serologic evidence of infection in the abattoir 
workers who had contact with the infected animals. This 
finding leaves key questions about zoonotic transmission 
unanswered. Most notably, it remains unclear whether 
zoonotic transmission of MERS-CoV occurs between 
camels and humans and, if so, what the directionality 
and risk factors are for such transmission. These linger-
ing gaps in knowledge about MERS-CoV emphasize the 
need for more epidemiologic study to determine risk fac-
tors for human infection, more population-level data on 
the prevalence of MERS-CoV in camels, risk factors for 
infection and shedding in camels, and continued vigilance 
for other possible sources of infection. Also, the camels 
tested were in Egypt and were locally reared or imported 
from Sudan or Ethiopia, countries in which no cases have 
been identified in humans. Thus, the geographic area for 
surveillance should be widened beyond the Arabian Pen-
insula and include eastern Africa, which is a source for 
importation of dromedary camels. This study emphasizes 
the need to further define exposure information for all 
MERS-CoV cases regarding camels and other animals, as 
well as exposure to ill humans who might have undetected 
MERS-CoV infections. Understanding the role of drom-
edary camels and possibly other animals in transmission 
of MERS-CoV to humans remains a priority for future 
investigation to enable development of targeted control 
measures and prevent future cases and deaths from this 
emerging pathogen.
Dr Watson is a medical officer with the Division of Viral 
Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in Atlanta, 
Georgia, USA. His research interests include the epidemiology 
and control of viral respiratory diseases.
References
  1. Pollack MP, Pringle C, Madoff LC, Memish ZA. Latest outbreak news 
from ProMED-mail: novel coronavirus—Middle East. Int J Infect 
Dis. 2013;17:e143–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2012.12.001
  2. World Health Organization. Global Alert and Response (GAR). 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)— 
update. 2014 7 February [cited 2014 Feb 24]. http://www.who.int/
csr/don/2014_02_07mers/en/
  3. World Health Organization. Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) summary and literature update—as of 20 
January 2014 [cited 2014 Feb 24]. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ 
coronavirus_infections/MERS_CoV_Update_20_Jan_2014.pdf?ua=1
  4. World Health Organization, MERS-CoV Research Group. State 
of knowledge and data gaps of Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in humans. PLoS Curr. 2013;5:pii: 
ecurrents.outbreaks.0bf719e352e7478f8ad85fa30127ddb8.
  5. Memish ZA, Zumla AI, Al-Hakeem RF, Al-Rabeeah AA, 
Stephens GM. Family cluster of Middle East respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus infections [Erratum in: N Engl J Med. 2013;369:587]. N Engl 
J Med. 2013;368:2487–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1303729
  6. Assiri A, McGeer A, Perl TM, Price C, Al Rabeeah AA, 
Cummings DAT, et al. Hospital outbreak of Middle East respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus. N Engl J Med. 2013;369:407–16. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1306742
  7. Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Kerkhove MDV, Donnelly CA, Riley S, 
Rambaut A, et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus: 
quantification of the extent of the epidemic, surveillance biases, 
and transmissibility. Lancet Infect Dis. 2014;14:50–6. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S1473-3099(13)70304-9
  8. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Interim infection pre-
vention and control recommendations for hospitalized patients with 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) [cited 
2014 Feb 24]. http://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/infection- 
prevention-control.html
  9. Cotten M, Lam TT, Watson SJ, Palser AL, Petrova V, Grant P, 
et al. Full-genome deep sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of 
novel human betacoronavirus. Emerg Infect Dis. 2013;19:736–42. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1905.130057
10. Ithete NL, Stoffberg S, Corman VM, Cottontail VM, Richards LR, 
Schoeman MC, et al. Close relative of human Middle East respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus in bat, South Africa. Emerg Infect Dis. 
2013;19:1697–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1910.130946
11. Haagmans BL, Dhahiry SHSA, Reusken CBEM, Raj VS, Galiano M, 
Myers R, et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in 
dromedary camels: an outbreak investigation. Lancet Infect Dis. 
2014;14:140–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(13)70690-X
12. Alagaili AN, Briese T, Mishra N, Kapoor V, Stephen C, Sameroff SC, 
et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection in 
dromedary camels in Saudi Arabia. MBio. 2014;5:e00884–14. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/mBio.00884-14
13. Hemida MG, Perera RA, Wang P, Alhammadi MA, Siu LY, Li M, 
et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus serop-
revalence in domestic livestock in Saudi Arabia, 2010 to 2013. Euro 
Surveill. 2013;18:20659
14. Reusken CB, Ababneh M, Raj VS, Meyer B, Eljarah A, Abutarbush S, 
et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) serology in major livestock species in an affected region in 
Jordan, June to September 2013. Euro Surveill. 2013;18:20662. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES2013.18.50.20662
15. Perera RA, Wang P, Gomaa MR, El-Shesheny R, Kandeil A, 
Bagato O, et al. Seroepidemiology for MERS coronavirus us-
ing microneutralisation and pseudoparticle virus neutralisation 
assays reveal a high prevalence of antibody in dromedary camels 





16. Reusken CB, Haagmans BL, Müller MA, Gutierrez C, Godeke GJ, 
Meyer B, et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
neutralising serum antibodies in dromedary camels: a comparative 
serological study. Lancet Infect Dis. 2013;13:859–66. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S1473-3099(13)70164-6
17. Meyer B, Müller MA, Corman VM, Reusken CBEM, Ritz D, 
Godeke G-D, et al. Antibodies against MERS coronavirus in dromedary 
camels, United Arab Emirates, 2003 and 2013. Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 
Apr [cited 2014 Feb 24]. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2004.131746
18. Chu DKW, Poon LLM, Gomaa MM, Shehata MM, Perera RAPM, 
Zeid DA, et al. MERS coronaviruses in dromedary camels, Egypt. 
Emerg Infect Dis [Internet]. 2014 Jun [cited 2014 Feb 27]. http://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/20/6/14-0299_article.htm
19. Memish ZA, Mishra N, Olival KJ, Fagbo SF, Kapoor V, Epstein JH, 
et al. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in bats, 
Saudi Arabia. Emerg Infect Dis. 2013;19:1819–23d http://dx.doi.
org/10.3201/eid1911.131172
Address for correspondence: John T. Watson, Division of Viral Diseases, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd NE, Mailstop 
A34, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA; email: acq4@cdc.gov
The	opinions	expressed	by	authors	contributing	to	this	journal	do	not	
necessarily	reflect	the	opinions	of	the	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	
Prevention	or	the	institutions	with	which	the	authors	are	affiliated.
